Scanner Finds the Same Hole in 70% of 20 AI-Built Apps
Apps built with Claude, Cursor and Lovable often reach production with the same holes. A poster on r/SaaS ran a scanner over 20 such projects, and in roughly 70% of them found the same problem: API keys left in git history. The seller of the scanner has an incentive to publish a striking number, so treat this as a rough signal, not a statistic. Still, checking a repository's history for keys takes an evening.
AI-processed from TG: @bezsmuzi (Русский ИТ бизнес); edited by Hamidun News
Vibe coding lets you build a working SaaS over a weekend, but the speed often comes with the same mistakes. A user on r/SaaS tested this in practice: they ran 20 apps written with Claude, Cursor and Lovable through a security scanner. By their account, roughly 70% of them had the same hole. Below we look at what they found and what to do if you are shipping a product written with AI.
What the scanner found
The most common finding was API keys that remained in git history and were never replaced. Next in frequency were routes without authorization checks, meaning backend endpoints that anyone can call without confirming they are allowed to. The third problem was an open database.
For the database, the author offers a simple fix: one line of SQL plus an access rule. He does not specify which DBMS he means. But from the description, it sounds like enabling row-level access restrictions, which projects that pair with a cloud database often overlook. This is our assumption; the post does not state it directly.
Importantly, all three problems are mundane. These are not sophisticated attacks on the model or clever exploits. They are basic hygiene that an experienced person checks almost automatically, and that an assistant may skip by default, since it is completing the task "make it work," not "lock it down."
Why a key in git history is still a leak
The typical scenario looks like this. A service key ends up in code or in a settings file, either the assistant or the developer commits it. Later someone notices, deletes the line, and commits again. The current version of the file has no key, so it looks clean.
But git keeps the entire history. Anyone with access to the repository can open an old commit and copy the key. If the repository is or was ever public, the key should be considered compromised. Deleting the line does not revoke the key. Only replacement helps: issue a new key with the provider and disable the old one.
This is exactly what the author points out: the keys were not replaced. In other words, people noticed the problem, or could have, but stopped halfway.
How to read the number and what to do
The author sells the scanner, and the channel that repeated his post openly cautions against taking the figure at face value. A sample of 20 apps is small and, apparently, not random. The testing methodology is not disclosed in the retelling, and it is unclear which findings count as "the same hole" or how serious they were. So "70%" is a signal, not industry-wide statistics.
But the set of problems is familiar to anyone who has looked at quickly assembled code. That means checking does not require trusting someone else's number. Here is a minimal list for an evening:
- Review the repository history for keys and tokens. Ready-made secret-scanning tools exist for this; replace any keys you find with the provider rather than just deleting them from the code.
- Go through every backend route and confirm that each one checks who is calling and what they are permitted to do.
- Verify that database access rules are enabled and that an anonymous client cannot read other users' data.
- Ask your assistant for a security review in a separate request, but do not treat its answer as a guarantee.
For founders shipping a product without a security engineer, the takeaway is simple: the speed of code generation does not replace a basic pre-launch check. That check takes hours, while a leaked key or an open database can cost you users and reputation.
The author also left readers with a question: when did you last check your repository's history for keys? If the answer is "never," that is where to start.
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Key Questions Answered
What the scanner found?
The most common finding was API keys that remained in git history and were never replaced. Next in frequency were routes without authorization checks, meaning backend endpoints that anyone can call without confirming they are allowed to. The third problem was an open database. For the database, the author offers a simple fix: one line of SQL plus an access rule. He does not specify which DBMS he means.
Why a key in git history is still a leak?
The typical scenario looks like this. A service key ends up in code or in a settings file, either the assistant or the developer commits it. Later someone notices, deletes the line, and commits again. The current version of the file has no key, so it looks clean. But git keeps the entire history. Anyone with access to the repository can open an old commit and copy the key. If the repository is or was ever public, the key should be considered compromised. Deleting the line does not revoke the key.
How to read the number and what to do?
The author sells the scanner, and the channel that repeated his post openly cautions against taking the figure at face value. A sample of 20 apps is small and, apparently, not random. The testing methodology is not disclosed in the retelling, and it is unclear which findings count as "the same hole" or how serious they were. So "70%" is a signal, not industry-wide statistics. But the set of problems is familiar to anyone who has looked at quickly assembled code.
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