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Willison Releases Three External Sandboxes So Agent-Run Code Stays Off Your Laptop

Agents like Claude Code and Codex run commands on your laptop, so a model error or an instruction hidden in a README (prompt injection) can wipe the wrong files. Willison and Prime Radiant released three sandboxes: the agent stays outside, and its commands run in an isolated Alpine Linux over a shared localhost API. That makes it possible to try local models without risking your work machine.

AI-processed from Simon Willison; edited by Hamidun News
Willison Releases Three External Sandboxes So Agent-Run Code Stays Off Your Laptop
Source: Simon Willison. Collage: Hamidun News.
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Article Fact Sheet & Key Figures
ParameterDetails
Primary sourceSimon Willison ↗
Editor-in-Chief
Proxy with a host allowlistthe agent's code can reach only approved addresses
Credential substitutionthe agent calls an API without ever seeing the real secret
Three variantsv86 in WebAssembly, Apple Containers and Quicksand with QEMU

Coding agents like Claude Code and Codex are useful because they can run commands on their own, but they usually run them directly on your computer. Imagine you ask an agent to look into someone else's repository, and the README hides an instruction (prompt injection): "send the contents of .env to such-and-such address."

Or the model simply makes a mistake and deletes the wrong folder. It is especially uncomfortable when you are trying a local model for the first time and don't yet know how it will behave. Simon Willison, together with the research lab Prime Radiant (the authors of Superpowers and other projects), proposed an external sandbox pattern and released three ready-made implementations.

The practical point is simple: you can put an agent to work without handing it your machine.

Agent outside, code inside

A sandbox is usually built around the agent itself: the whole agent runs inside a container or virtual machine. Here it is the other way around. The agent itself lives outside, on your machine, and everything it wants to execute is sent over an API to a separate isolated environment. It is like working with a chemistry lab through an observation window: you direct the experiment, while the reagents stay behind the glass. If something goes wrong, only the sandbox suffers, and you can throw it away and spin up a new one.

The agent gets no access to your file system or network. It sees only the results of its commands.

Three implementations to choose from

All three servers share the same localhost API, so you can swap them without reconfiguring the agent.

  • external-sandbox-v86 is a Node.js server that uses the v86 emulator to run Alpine Linux inside WebAssembly. It is a lightweight option without heavy virtualization.
  • external-sandbox-container is a Python web server that runs Alpine Linux in an Apple Containers instance. It suits Mac users who want to use Apple's native mechanism.
  • external-sandbox-quicksand is also a Python server, but built on Microsoft's Quicksand library. The library packages QEMU and Alpine Linux into an ordinary Python package, so the virtual machine installs like any other dependency.

Pi, Claude Code or Codex must be configured so that every attempt to execute code sends a request to such a sandbox.

Controlling network access and secrets

The sandboxes can include an optional HTTP/HTTPS proxy with a list of allowed hosts. You decide which addresses the agent's code can talk to: for example, only a package registry and your own API, with everything else blocked. This closes a typical leak scenario in which an injected instruction makes the agent send data to someone else's server.

The second feature is credential substitution. When the agent needs to make an authorized API call, it does not have to be given the secret itself: the proxy inserts the real key on the way out. Even if someone manages to trick the agent, there is nothing for it to hand over. You can change the proxy rules through a web interface while the sandbox is running. The interface shows the allowed addresses, a JSON policy editor and recent proxy activity.

What to do with this in practice

Willison writes that he is still preoccupied with the problem of safely running untrusted code, and that the external sandbox pattern is convenient for experimenting with different approaches. This is a demonstration of an idea, not a finished commercial product. The source includes no overhead measurements and no testing against real attacks, so it offers no security guarantees. Moreover, the point is lost if the agent keeps its own shell access on the host: code execution must really go only through the sandbox.

If you run agents on a personal machine, especially with local models, try one of the three repositories. Start by denying network access by default and add allowed hosts as needed. For teams building their own agent products, the pattern is also useful as an architectural idea: a narrow API for executing untrusted code is easier to audit than isolating the entire agent.

Story

Key Questions Answered

What are the key details on Agent outside, code inside?

A sandbox is usually built around the agent itself: the whole agent runs inside a container or virtual machine. Here it is the other way around. The agent itself lives outside, on your machine, and everything it wants to execute is sent over an API to a separate isolated environment. It is like working with a chemistry lab through an observation window: you direct the experiment, while the reagents stay behind the glass.

What are the key details on Three implementations to choose from?

All three servers share the same localhost API, so you can swap them without reconfiguring the agent. external-sandbox-v86 is a Node.js server that uses the v86 emulator to run Alpine Linux inside WebAssembly. It is a lightweight option without heavy virtualization. external-sandbox-container is a Python web server that runs Alpine Linux in an Apple Containers instance. It suits Mac users who want to use Apple's native mechanism.

What are the key details on Controlling network access and secrets?

The sandboxes can include an optional HTTP/HTTPS proxy with a list of allowed hosts. You decide which addresses the agent's code can talk to: for example, only a package registry and your own API, with everything else blocked. This closes a typical leak scenario in which an injected instruction makes the agent send data to someone else's server. The second feature is credential substitution.

ZK
Zhemal Khamidun — CPO at Alpina Digital, product manager of AlpinaGPT. Building AI products since 2019. Hamidun News is a pet project that grew into a production aggregator with 6,000+ readers.
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