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Architecture Repository Showed 0 AI Agents; a Log Reconciliation Found 34

The architecture repository is formally in order, but it contains no agents: teams build them in a day on an already-paid platform, and they never enter the registration process. The author reconciled MCP configs and 90 days of LLM gateway logs and found 34 agents across 9 teams. The experiment is synthetic, but the mechanics are familiar: the repository answers the question "what should exist," while traces show what actually does.

AI-processed from Habr AI; edited by Hamidun News
Architecture Repository Showed 0 AI Agents; a Log Reconciliation Found 34
Source: Habr AI. Collage: Hamidun News.
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Article Fact Sheet & Key Figures
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Primary sourceHabr AI ↗
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Key metric #118 of 34 agents have no business owner, and 14 run under human accounts
Key metric #27 agents reach MCP directly, bypassing the gateway, connecting to 7 systems
Key metric #310 agents have been silent for more than 30 days, yet their accounts remain enabled

The architecture team's quarterly report is green: every application has an owner, integrations follow approved channels, and the target landscape is signed off. A week later, the security team asks who allowed a bot to access the HR system under a living employee's account. The architect opens the repository and sees the same thing as yesterday: no agents. Not because the company has none, but because the repository cannot see them.

Tech Lead Sergey Proshchaev analyzed this situation on a synthetic company and presented it in numbers. Real-world surveys confirm the scale. According to the Cloud Security Alliance and Strata Identity (February 2026), only 21% of organizations maintain a real-time agent registry. In an April CSA survey, 82% of respondents said they had found agents they had not known about before, and for 41% this had happened more than once.

How to Find Agents If the Repository Is Blind

The idea is simple: the repository is not a starting point but one of several sources. If you start from it, there is nothing to find, since everything is green. So the reconciliation works from traces.

The first trace is the teams' MCP configs. MCP (Model Context Protocol) is the protocol through which AI applications get tools and data. The config shows which servers are connected to an agent and at which addresses. The second trace is the 90-day LLM gateway log: which agent, under which account, and how many requests it sent to the model. An IAM export does not find agents, but it enriches the ones already found: whose account it is, whether it is enabled, and what permissions it has.

In the test company the repository is exemplary: 36 applications, 35 with a business owner filled in, all 41 integrations running through approved channels, and zero items of type "AI agent." The reconciliation found 34 agents across 9 teams, and every one has at least one of six flaws. The author states up front that he set the proportions in the data himself. This is not market statistics but a demonstration of what the method catches.

Six Holes the Repository Does Not See

1. The agent is not registered as an agent. For 30 of 34 there is no record at all; four are listed as ordinary applications. An application enters the repository through procurement or a project, while a team builds an agent in a day on an already-paid platform. The result: you decommission the HR system without knowing that three agents depend on it.

2. No business owner. This applies to 18 of 34. A technical owner, i.e. the team lead, exists for all of them, but he is responsible for the code, not for whether the bot may answer employees about vacation pay. In the April CSA survey, only 15% of organizations had defined an owner for 76–100% of their agents.

3. The agent runs under a human's account. 14 of 34 do so. The PocketOS story shows the price. According to the founder, in April 2026 an agent in Cursor, working in a test environment, found a Railway API token. The token had been issued for managing domains, but it allowed any operation. The agent deleted the production database volume along with the volume-level backups, and it took nine seconds.

4. MCP is connected around the gateway. Seven agents hold 9 direct connections to 7 systems. The architecture board approves integrations between applications, but nobody counts a line in a config as an integration. The gateway does not see such requests and can neither restrict nor disable them.

5. Possible duplicates. Four business capabilities are covered by 19 agents from different teams. If three agents calculate revenue in three ways, management gets three figures, and the company pays for three sets of access.

6. Zombie agents. Ten agents have not sent a single request in over 30 days, yet their accounts are enabled. CSA calls this "retirement debt": agents outlive their task and keep their permissions. Only 21% of respondents have a formal decommissioning process.

What to Do and Where It Won't Work

The practical set of measures is as follows:

  • In the repository's metamodel, create a separate "AI agent" type with mandatory fields: a correlation key to the traces, model, list of MCP servers, account, owner.
  • Introduce the rule "no business owner, no service account," so the field is filled in before launch.
  • Give each deployment a machine account with short-lived tokens. If an agent acts on behalf of an employee, that is delegation, not logging in with their password.
  • Treat connecting an MCP server as an integration and check the config automatically: HTTPS, gateway host, port 443. Traffic routing is confirmed only by network rules and the gateway log.
  • Tie each agent to a business capability. The reconciliation finds duplicate candidates; the board makes the decision.
  • Send silent agents to the owner for a decision rather than disabling them immediately: a quarterly agent is legitimately silent for a month. On decommissioning, the record is not deleted but gets the status "retired."

Registration guarantees nothing by itself. It becomes a launch condition only through a check on the deployment platform: no record means no account and no deployment. Reconciliation does not replace registration; it catches what slipped past it. BCG proposes a "golden path": a ready-made agent template with built-in registration, account, monitoring and policies. The right path must also be the fastest, otherwise people will bypass it.

The method has limitations. The data is synthetic; in a real company there are more traces: an MCP server catalog, IAM, provider invoices, network logs. An agent that calls a model from an employee's laptop will be found only by network rules. A local MCP server over standard input/output has no address, so the reconciliation skips it. The account check looks only at type: it will not catch a shared service account across several agents or excessive permissions. And a company with three agents is fine with a table listing owner and account.

The conclusion is simple: if a company has more agents than people who remember them by heart, reconcile the list of traces against the repository once a week. The repository answers "what should exist," the traces answer "what does exist," and the architect's job is to keep the gap close to zero. The author has published the experiment's code in an open repository: start with expected.txt and audit.py.

Story

Key Questions Answered

How to Find Agents If the Repository Is Blind?

The idea is simple: the repository is not a starting point but one of several sources. If you start from it, there is nothing to find, since everything is green. So the reconciliation works from traces. The first trace is the teams' MCP configs. MCP (Model Context Protocol) is the protocol through which AI applications get tools and data. The config shows which servers are connected to an agent and at which addresses.

What are the key details on Six Holes the Repository Does Not See?

1. The agent is not registered as an agent. For 30 of 34 there is no record at all; four are listed as ordinary applications. An application enters the repository through procurement or a project, while a team builds an agent in a day on an already-paid platform. The result: you decommission the HR system without knowing that three agents depend on it. 2. No business owner. This applies to 18 of 34. A technical owner, i.e.

What to Do and Where It Won't Work?

The practical set of measures is as follows: In the repository's metamodel, create a separate "AI agent" type with mandatory fields: a correlation key to the traces, model, list of MCP servers, account, owner. Introduce the rule "no business owner, no service account," so the field is filled in before launch. Give each deployment a machine account with short-lived tokens. If an agent acts on behalf of an employee, that is delegation, not logging in with their password.

ZK
Zhemal Khamidun — CPO at Alpina Digital, product manager of AlpinaGPT. Building AI products since 2019. Hamidun News is a pet project that grew into a production aggregator with 6,000+ readers.
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