Coface: artificial intelligence threatens high wages and tax revenues in Britain

Coface and Observatoire des Emplois Menacés et Émergents research has shown that the UK is more exposed to AI-driven task automation than other developed countries. The risk extends beyond employment: if automation pressure falls on high-paying office professions, the budget could lose a portion of key tax revenue.

Why Britain is Vulnerable

According to the study, among 12 developed economies, the UK received the highest share of tasks exposed to automation: approximately 20% of all workload. By comparison, France came closer to 16%, and Germany and the US—roughly 17%. The authors specifically note an important caveat: this is not a direct forecast of immediate unemployment, but rather a technical exposure of tasks to automation potential. However, for a country with a large share of financial, legal, management, and information services, this is already sufficient to speak of systemic risk.

A separate problem is that AI does not target the cheapest roles, but those where money, taxes, and corporate expertise are concentrated. The report states that for professions occupied by the highest-earning 10% of workers, 20–25% of task content is at risk. For the British economy, this is especially sensitive: London and other business centers have grown over the years as platforms for headquarters, financial services, consulting, IT, and media. If AI-systems take on part of such work, the productivity gains will initially be captured by companies and infrastructure owners, while the salary tax base could decline.

Where the Impact is Stronger

AI is most suited to tasks where information is processed into information: data analysis, text preparation, document structuring, calculations, routine scenario verification. Therefore, the study identifies the highest exposure indicators in engineering and computing professions—29%, in legal and financial—27%, in creative and content—27%, in management and administrative—24%.

This aligns well with the structure of the British economy, where service industries are already implementing AI more actively than manufacturing and construction. The government assessment formulates this skew directly: AI is more likely to affect professions involving cognitive rather than physical tasks. Therefore, a builder, driver, or care worker is currently better protected than an analyst, lawyer, editor, or office manager.

For Britain, this is an especially unpleasant scenario, because the country has historically relied precisely on expensive intellectual labor and its role as a European hub for international business.

• Financial and related professional services brought the UK budget £110.2 billion in taxes in 2024, or 12.3% of all revenue.
• In coming years, 13% of professions could cross the threshold where more than 30% of their tasks are automated.
• By British authorities' estimate, current AI technologies potentially affect 10–30% of jobs, with stronger impact on qualified cognitive roles.
• By mid-2025, job openings in professions with high AI exposure were approximately 5.5% below expected levels.

This does not yet look like a one-time wave of layoffs. Rather, the market is sending early signals: companies are more cautious in hiring for routine intellectual positions while simultaneously complaining of a shortage of new skills. In a 2025 DSIT survey, 97% of employers reported at least one AI competency gap, and 57%—a lack of technical skills.

This means that some tasks will automate faster than the education system and labor market can restructure career paths.

What This Means

For Britain, the AI debate becomes not only a conversation about productivity growth, but a question of how to finance the state in an economy where fewer earnings are tied to human labor. If high-paying office roles begin to shrink faster than new ones emerge, the country will need to simultaneously retrain people, support transitions between professions, and seek new tax sources—closer to capital, profit, and AI infrastructure.